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(sC. X \IvXt7). Compare also Leucippus frag. 2: 4K XO70V (Opp. Marnv).
As explanation, a Xo6yos may also be a "formula," or kind of definition (in a broad sense). The formula gives an account of the thing to which it applies. Plato (Rep. vi. 497c) speaks of the X6O' roX vWLretas, and (Phaedrus 245e) of the ovi'la TE Kacl X6yos of the soul. Aristotle's statement Top. 102a5 is interesting: 7ras 6Opo.6s Xoyos rts 40"M The last division under the general heading of "explanation" is "reason, law, exhibited in the world-process." The only examples of this usage, often supposed to explain many of the fragments of Heraclitus, are a doubtful passage of Epicharmus (frag. 2 Diels), Plato Rep. vi. 500c (KoOptw ravTa Kal KaTa X6yov eXoVra), and instances from the Stoic and Neo-Platonic literature. To Plotinus and the NeoPlatonists it meant "regulative and formative forces, derived from the intelligible and operative in the sensible universe." It is doubtful whether a trace of this idea can be found in Heraclitus.
IV. Next are considered a number of passages in most of which the conventional translation of Xo6yos would be "reason." They are thought by the editors of the lexicon to reflect "inward debate of the soul," thinking being treated as primarily reasoning. One endeavors to "give account" to himself. Thus oratio is throughout subordinated to ratio. The only Heraclitean fragment classified here is 2: rov' RI XO6yov 4vros (vvoV, ?4ovouv oL roXXol 's ltacv EXOVrEs q5p6v7ow. Though reasoning is common to all men (i.e., open to all), they live as though they had private insight. It will be seen later that in this passage X06yos probably implies more than that.
Of the earlier passages cited, none seems to show the meaning "reflection." For example, in Anaxagoras frag. 7 (A.v' ell-vat ....
1.LtTE
X6'yq /u rp"y) we can perhaps translate "neither by calculation nor through experience." However, this meaning emerges in Plato and Aristotle along with the development of the mind-body and soul-intellect dichotomies.
"Reason as a faculty" is found in pseudo-Epicharmus 256 (frag. 57 Diels), Plato, and the Stoics. Naturally, when Sextus Empiricus speaks of the 'Xyos in Heraclitus in opposition to alZoG077ts, he is not using Heraclitean language.
The Xoyos can also indicate (V) a narrative, oration, etc., or (VI) simply verbal expression or utterance, often contrasted with EpPyov. In Her. frag. 87, X6yos probably means "rumor."
The other main divisions do not specially concern us. They represent usages which are derived or late and mostly unphilosophical (VII, a particular utterance; VIII, subject matter; IX, expression, speech regarded formally; and X, the Word or Wisdom of God).
It will be seen from this brief survey that the fundamental idea of X6^yos is that of an accounting, and that this idea is retained throughout the early history of the word at least as an undertone. At an early period "account" in the sense related to "count" passes into the sense related to "recount" ("explain, narrate"). But the xo6yos is always at least "verbal expression" and never simply "word." Gradually, the simple discrepancy reflected in the opposition between X6-yos and ep'yov develops into an idea of the separation of Xoyos and vrOKEqIEVOV, and we have the emergence of an epistemological usage of the word.5
With the beginning of rhetorical thought, there is increasing emphasis on the word as an organ of persuasion. It is sufficient to mention the attitude of the Sophists in regard to the power and importance of speech.
Besides the few Heraclitean fragments in which Xo6yos has the sense of "expression" or the like, there are a number, much harder to interpret, in which it obviously has a more general significance. Heraclitus speaks of a power which pilots the world,6 and the X6-yos has been thought to be simply equivalent to this. Sometimes, Heraclitus seems to identify it loosely with the gods and to attribute to it some of the elements of personality.7 It is dangerous however to overemphasize this fact, because Heraclitus was much more interested in the philosophy of natural process than in theology as such. His expressions about the gods and the divine are in part rationalistic and opposed to the spirit of traditional religious conceptions,8 in part poetic and general, clothing in theological language ideas which are in essence entirely secular.9 Thus the power which pilots the world cannot be identified The only instances of the word cited by Kranz as comparable to these are Leucippus frag. 2 and a report about Democritus from Simpl. Phys., p.28, 1. 15 which surely do not belong here, and two passages from pseudo-Epicharmus.
Of the passages cited by Kranz under the lemma "menschliche Vernunft" none is impressive. Fragment 45 means that the soul is hard to fathom. Burnet's translation is: "You will not find the boundaries of soul by traveling in any direction, so deep is the measure of it." Fragment 115 (4vxi s EoTt XO6yos gaVTrO av`@vw) probably means not, as Diels would have it, that man's understanding grows with his age but that the soul is thought of as closely parallel, in nature and functions, to the body, as needing and receiving nourishment, and consequently as "growing."''8
Kranz lists a number of passages from other authors here, but it would not be worth while to discuss them in detail. It is doubtful whether any of them can be said to attest the use of Xo-yos as reason among the Presocratics. By far the most of them are from the A divisions, and many of these quite obviously belong to later interpretation. The passages from Heraclitus have been seen to prove nothing. In Parmenides frag. 7,1.5 (KpZvaL R X6ooyw roXvb87ptv `Xe-yXov), Xo6yos means "dialectical argument," as Burnet says,'9 or "thought" in the sense of the weighing of reasons, and is distinct from the Heraclitean usage.
This discussion has perhaps helped to establish the presumption This is a valuable observation, and it will be well to bear it in mind. The Xo-yos doubtless does carry to some extent the implication of "truth"; but since the use of the word specifically as equal to "truth" is late, if indeed it occurs at all (and, even according to Gigon's interpretation, it can only mean "this book as an embodiment of truth"), it may be well to look for more specific implications. The problem is to find the way in which the idea of universality must be connected with the normal or possible meanings of Xo Heraclitus. He points out that X'-yeV can frequently be translated "to signify" and holds that this connotation passes into the verbal noun Xoyos. Thus Xo-yos has the double sense of meaningful human speech and the meaning which lies in things. Things speak to us, as it were. Thus the Xo6yos of frag. 1, says Snell, is not only the "explanation" of Heraclitus. This explanation has actuality. It is more than the "opinion" of the philosopher; it is the "sense" which is in the world and which alone gives "content" to the world. It would seem, however, that the significance of the fragment is somewhat more simple than this. The point is not so much that Heraclitus felt himself dependent on and connected with the universal, as that he felt strongly and wished to emphasize clearly that true understanding (av'veaLs) is only to be attained by attention to that which is common, the vvowv , by observance of "regularity" rather than of detail (iroXvAa6CWt). Undoubtedly, Xo-yos does carry some of the implication which Snell wishes to attribute to it. It means not only that which man says but that which speaks to man. It is rather different, however, to say that it is "the meaningful" or "Sinn, Bedeutung, das Tiefste und Eigentlichste der Welt." I believe we can assign it a more definite content than this.
A consequence of Snell's explanation which shows its inadequacy lies in the interpretation which he is compelled to give to the relationship of the Xo- EPaPTlOT77rw understandable to man. Obviously, this is not far from the Xo6yos of fragments 1 and 2. What, then, is the "apparent harmony"? Evidently, the states of equilibrium which are observable everywhere. The eternal give and take of fire-earth-water-earth-fire is at a standstill in an ordinary object like a table. Its appearance of permanence we interpret as real permanence, whereas in fact it is involved in the eternal process of change. Real knowledge is apprehension of the "hidden harmony"; concern with the apparent is 7roXv,.iaOL77. It is interesting to correlate this fact with the concept of vo,uos. One would expect the law of a city to be a good example of "apparent harmony." Social institutions are always in flux, and it is war which assigns to men their stations in life (frag. 53); yet we learn that, just as man must hold to the 6'yos, the city must hold to its law.29 It is not an apparent or momentary equilibrium but a static principle, consistent with the philosopher's well-known aristocratic political sympathies. Heraclitus' philosophy is not a closed system, consistent in every respect. Alongside the vigorous affirmation of the fact of change are hints of a static world.
An aspect of the significance of the word 'Xyos, which I believe has not been sufficiently emphasized as contributing to the Heraclitean concept, is that of proportionality, measure, and relationship. There are some fragments in which X6'yos surely bears this meaning. In frag. 31, Xo'yos may mean either "amount" or "proportion": &aXaocoa &ta-X6yTaL Kat /erTperTaL elS TOv avrov X'Oev OKO lOS wp6oaEv i yevoOaL y'.
In the cyclical process of the change of the elements the sea is poured back in the same proportion, or to the same amount, as before it became earth. That Heraclitus was thinking of the quantitative relations of fire and water is shown by the last sentence of this fragment.30 We may compare also frag. 115: 4Ivxis 'aTtL X6'yos Eavrov aQcov. The Xo'yos of the soul increases itself. Doubtless Gigon is right in understanding this to refer to the need of the soul for nourishment, possibly from the blood.31 We learn from frag. 12 that "souls rise from dampness by evaporation." Even the soul is not a fixed and changeless thing but is involved as an integral member in the war of opposites. While it is impossible to determine the exact bearing of Heraclitus' observation, it may be directed, at least in part, toward such a conception of the soul as was held by the Orphics and Pythagoras, which tended to make it a thing wholly separate and apart from the body and superior to physical change. Heraclitus shows that change is inherent in the very constitution of the soul.
The idea of proportionality is explicitly brought into connection with the Heraclitean cosmology in frag. clitus the coming-to-be of all things (i.e., the world-process, which is essentially the reciprocal interaction of opposites) takes place Kar' epwV KaL xpCcov. A similar concept is to be found in the 7rvIKv'COTLS Kal apaxnos attributed to Anaximenes. It is notable that, while he engages in vigorous polemic against Homer, Archilochus, Hesiod, Hecataeus, Xenophanes, and especially Pythagoras, Heraclitus' only mention of the Milesian philosophers is in frag. 38, which states that Thales was the first astronomer.
It has been noted that special prominence is to be given to the significances of o6yos connected with "counting" and "rendering account." The conjecture seems justified that these implications were much more prominent in the mind of one who used the word at the time of our philosopher than later. The meaning of "proportion" is at least as old as Theognis, who wrote in the sixth century, and many examples are found from the succeeding period.33 Besides the fragments already quoted, Heraclitus has other analogous uses. The difficult and doubtful frag. 126a may be mentioned,34 as well as 67a: "(corpori anima) proportionaliter iuncta est." There are one or two passages from the doxography which may reflect Heraclitean usage in this particular, especially Aet. physical reality which transcends the world of change. In the example given above, the worthlessness of man is to be understood by reference to the "perfection" of the divinity; and it is brought out in order to point emphatically, by contrast, toward that perfection. The same is true of the comparison of man, god, and ape in frags. 82 and 83. The thought pattern is used primarily to express the inexpressible, to bring closer by extrapolation that which is ordinarily beyond human reach. It thus becomes a device to approach the transcendental, metaphysical reality, somewhat in a mystical sense." However, this does not seem entirely consistent with Heraclitus' general point of view. The principle and law embodied in the Xoyos and the divinity seem to be not transcendent but immanent in the world-process. The words of frag. 79, cited above, do not in themselves prove the existence of an "absolute,"45 but only that the divine is relatively much wiser than man. On the other hand, frag. 67, e.g., clearly shows the divinity subject to change, entering into (or being implicit in) the "war of oppo- shaping the form of his discourse. However, the concept carried different implications for the two systems. For Pythagoras harmony and proportion meant proper subordination of the inferior, and the existence of a transcendent principle which guaranteed the justice and the continuance of this state of affairs. For Heraclitus it meant recognition of the principle of strife and the perception of the beauty of unity rising from difference. To both the Pythagoreans and Plato true wisdom was the recognition of the changeless as the only real, whereas for Heraclitus it was the fact of change itself which was fundamental. The content of the vision which Heraclitus desiderates is in a sense "metaphysical" in that it involves perception of essentially abstract relationships. The Xoyos is present to all the phenomena of nature. It is the key to all knowledge and must be insisted upon with great emphasis. But, for all that, it does not imply a world apart from everyday life and experience.48 In the pattern of the geometric mean (A: B: :B C) as used by Heraclitus, much emphasis is laid on the possibility or necessity of transition from one term to another. For example, in cosmology fire: sea: :sea: earth ;49 the obos avW KaTrw is a continual process of transformation among these elements. If the proportion is used among the Pythagoreans, the point is that the relations are unchangeable. According to Heraclitus, the fluctuating vicissitudes of life make men slaves or kings, or even gods (frag. 53), but in the Pythagorean conception some are created better, some worsesome rulers, some ruled. The principle of justice, as in Plato, is akin not to strife but to harmony; and prudence is willing submission to one's lot.50
Perhaps the English word which can best cover most of the meaning which the Xoyos has for Heraclitus is "account." The 'Xyos is first of all Heraclitus' story, his explanation, and perhaps even his book. 48 It is difficult to expel from the interpretation of Heraclitus the separation of object and subject, thing and idea, God and the world, which has dominated philosophy since Plato. But even fragments like 32 and 108 probably do not involve this separation. As the latter shows clearly, the frame of reference is primarily the originality of Heraclitus' message and that which is separated from all things is not a transcendent God but a principle of explanation. 
